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al modelo) como el MAS logre el apoyo
del 54 por ciento del electorado y que en
el Congreso haya una cuota de renovación
del 90 por ciento, indica que el poder está
en proceso de reestructuración y se
encuentra en manos de nuevos actores
políticos. La antigua clase política, desa-
creditada y desgastada, ha sido reempla-
zada con una nueva clase de políticos que
en base a su organización y sus preferen-
cias han tomado el poder. Se puede consi-
derar que las decisiones tomadas en la pri-
mera ASP se han cumplido.
Además del éxito del proyecto “instru-
mento político” por la soberanía de los
pueblos, los factores que ayudaron a
hacerlo realidad fueron la crisis política
del Estado boliviano a raíz de la crisis del
sistema de partidos políticos y la habilidad
de Evo Morales de posicionarse como una
alternativa real, diferenciándose de los
políticos tradicionales.
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Several Latin American countries have
historic experiences with federal arrange-
ments and decentralized forms of gover-
nance. However, decentralization has
gained region wide attention as a highly
important political topic only when the
move towards democratization during the
last decades provoked a tendency to dele-
gate part of political autonomy to the sub-
national level. However, the process of
decentralization in Latin America has not
only led to positive outcomes. Instead,
many decentralization processes are still
plagued with deficiencies, which are not
only due to the resistance of centralist gov-
ernments. Rather, building state structures
compatible with the principle of subsidiari-
ty and market preserving federalism has
been complicated by immense coordination
problems at several levels of government
and among several types of political actors.
Given this background, this essay provides
a short overview on the normative aspira-
tions and the empirical reality of decentral-
ization processes in Latin American. Fur-
thermore, it attempts to provide
explanatory factors, which are able to
account for the lasting deficiencies and
incoherencies of decentralization processes
in the region. The essay concludes with a
special emphasis on the failure of political
parties to act as organizers of more coher-
ent decentralization processes in the region.
Normative Hopes and Empirical Reali-
ties
From a normative political perspective,
decentralization in Latin America has been
aiming to bring political legitimacy and
state services closer to the average citizen
in order to sustain, promote and further
consolidate the process of democratization.
Additionally, from a normative economic
perspective, decentralization has been pro-
moted because of the incentives market-
preserving federalism is supposed to have
on economic development. According to
this concept developed by political scientist
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Barry Weingast, beyond democratic subna-
tional elections, subnational entities should
have a high level of fiscal and administra-
tive autonomy in order to compete among
each other for investment and human capi-
tal. Following theoretic considerations,
high levels of fiscal and administrative sub-
national manoeuvring space then would not
only limit discretionary attempts of the cen-
tral state to politically allocate financial
resources and administrative responsibili-
ties. Additionally, sustainable competition
would also foster policy innovation and
imitation among subnational entities. Yet,
the concept of market preserving federal-
ism also embodies principles against “mar-
ket failure” of subnational competition. For
instance, central governments need to keep
strong fiscal responsibilities, oriented at
preventing subnational governments from
becoming excessively indebted and guar-
anteeing the free flow of capital and human
resources within the national territory.
Therefore, market-preserving federalism is
closely connected to the principle of sub-
sidiarity. States organized according to the
principle of subsidiarity, too, leave as much
resources and administrative competences
as possible at the subnational level. Only
when certain collective goods like macro-
economic stability, security against exter-
nal threat or the free flow of goods, finance
and persons cannot be guaranteed by sub-
national entities, the central government
has to take over such functions. While it is
a normatively and empirically highly
debated issue, which exact administrative
responsibilities fall under the latter catego-
ry, the functionality of subsidiarity for eco-
nomic development and political legitima-
cy is highly accepted among scholars and
political practitioners.
Confronting these normative guidelines
for reorganizing state structures in Latin
America with the reality of the “decentral-
ized” state in Latin America demonstrates
that the results of decentralization process-
es have only been partly successful. On the
one hand, subnational entities in Latin
America today have significantly more fis-
cal resources and administrative compe-
tences then three decades ago. Subnational-
ly elected bodies often do have a broader
base of political legitimacy than the nation-
al executive and legislative. Successfully
governing municipalities and provinces has
opened new political avenues for members
of formerly excluded social groups, so that
decentralization has helped to broaden the
social basis of national political elites.
Finally, political, fiscal and administrative
decentralization has improved living condi-
tions and economic development in several
municipalities and provinces around Latin
America. Nevertheless, on the other hand
decentralization processes have been
plagued with deficiencies, which demon-
strate that overall decentralization process-
es can lead to the weakening of the central
government, but also can be obstructed by
centralist elites.
Perhaps the most prominent deficiency
of decentralization connected with the
weakening of the central government has
consisted in problems of subnational
indebtedness. In most Latin American
countries, Chile being a noteworthy excep-
tion, the rising political autonomy from the
centre and the increasing political depen-
dency from subnational interests has set
incentives for subnational governments to
become excessively indebted. The subse-
quent “transfer” of subnational debt to the
national level has further increased the dif-
ficulties of guaranteeing macroeconomic
stability. Beyond this challenge of organiz-
ing the compatibility between fiscal decen-
tralization and macroeconomic stability,
decentralization processes have generally
increased tendencies of domestic fragmen-
tation. This, because such processes have
risen opportunities for regional groups to
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more effectively pronounce their regional
or sector specific interests, making it hard-
er for central governments to embody
these interests in an encompassing institu-
tional framework.
In many cases however, central gov-
ernments and rather centralist interests
groups such as health and education unions
have at least partly been successful in pre-
venting municipalities and provinces from
obtaining more autonomy. Still most of the
poor, small and remote municipalities lack
resources and administrative capacities.
More strikingly, decentralization has not
always led to a strengthening of subnation-
al governments. For instance, if adminis-
trative competences have been delegated
to lower levels of government without ade-
quately taking into account the subsequent
increase of financial needs, subnational
entities become politically more dependent
on fiscal transfers from the government. In
this context, the strong dependence of
most governments and municipalities on
fiscal transfer from the centre and their
respectively low reliance on own fiscal
revenues has created new vertical depen-
dencies. In many cases, this dependency
on fiscal transfers has created bazaar-like
situations, where political actors from the
national and subnational levels continu-
ously haggle over quotas and amounts,
making transfer rules prone to rather errat-
ic political bargaining processes.
Decentralization and the Challenges 
of Successfully Coordinating 
Institutional Change
As already has been insinuated, decen-
tralization and the process of transforming
state structures according to the principles
of market preserving federalism and sub-
sidiarity is a deeply political process.
Overly optimistic perspectives on decen-
tralization have proofed to be rather naïve,
because they assumed that decentralization
processes would be ordered by civil soci-
ety groups around the above-explained
normative principles. This is not to say that
such groups and participation of local
communities have not helped to reduce
clientelism and exclusionary structures of
policy processes at the subnational level.
NGOs also have made important contribu-
tions when promoting the topic of decen-
tralization at the national level. Unfortu-
nately however, local communities are
often guided by leaders dependent on ver-
tical structures of clientelistic networks or
party structures. Some of the most power-
ful social groups at the national level,
labour unions, are generally opposed to
decentralization. More importantly, local
and provincial governments, the national
executive and political parties play a cru-
cial role in shaping the specific courses of
decentralization processes. These actors’
diverging interests and their increasing
amount makes it extremely difficult to
organize the decentralization process
around the normative principles of market
preserving federalism and subsidiarity.
Decentralization attempts to funda-
mentally change the structure of political,
financial and administrative institutions.
As institutions are the formal and informal
rules which allocate legitimacy, financial
resources and policy responsibilities, deep
institutional change comes along with dis-
tribution conflicts. This argument has
already been made frequently with regard
to the vertical conflict dimension of decen-
tralization processes, where central govern-
ments are confronted with loosing substan-
tial influence. What has been made less
clear is that the characteristics of vertical
conflict between the national and subna-
tional level also depend on the concrete
dimension of decentralization. From a cen-
tral government’s perspective, political
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decentralization is the most worrisome,
because political autonomy reduces the
influence of central governments on the
political careers of subnational politicians.
Comparing fiscal and administrative decen-
tralization, the central government prefers
to delegate administrative competences to
fiscal resources because the grip on finan-
cial resources allows the central govern-
ment to control at least partially the policy
agenda of subnational political actors.
Within the fiscal realm, central govern-
ments tend to prefer transfers to the delega-
tion of revenue competences, the latter
leaving the government with more manoeu-
vring room than the former. As subnational
preferences generally are ordered in the
opposite way, this simple differentiation
already allows for several bargaining out-
comes. Furthermore, the resulting conflicts
not only result in struggles between the cen-
tral government and subnational entities but
also between municipalities and provinces.
For instance, the increasing importance of
regional/provincial entities in some Andean
countries like Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru
has come along with questions on how to
adequately integrate provincial govern-
ments into the institutional setting between
municipalities and the central government.
A more complex analysis of country-
specific dynamics of decentralization also
has to take into account the horizontal
conflict dimension. The above made dif-
ferentiation implicitly has assumed that
each level of government tends to follow
similar strategies. However, empirical evi-
dence from Latin America dismantles this
assumption to be weak. Decentralization
also provokes serious distribution con-
flicts at each level of government. For
instance, fiscal decentralization encom-
passes a reorganization of fiscal accounts,
which tend to influence sector ministries
differently and create conflicts within the
government. Conflicts within the central
government are also common, when
administrative decentralization creates
winners and losers at the national level. In
this context, sector ministries counting on
the centralist orientation of highly orga-
nized unions are better positioned when it
comes to delay the delegation of compe-
tences - even if such delegation is ade-
quate from a normative perspective. 
At lower levels of government,
provinces and municipalities are often too
many and too heterogeneous to develop
coherent, concrete and long-lasting strate-
gies; a classical collective action problem,
which can only be partly resolved by
municipal or provincial associations (which
are often highly politicised and weak). For
example, in Peru more than 1800 munici-
palities simply have not been capable to
organize durable organizational strength
against the centralist powerhouse located in
Lima. Beyond, there are also structural dif-
ferences among subnational entities, mak-
ing it more difficult to organize coherent
demands of fiscal and administrative decen-
tralization. For instance, weak and poor
municipalities tend to prefer financial trans-
fers against greater fiscal autonomy because
they know that at least in the medium term
they will be unable to create a sufficient tax
base. The opposite is the case with regard to
big and relatively wealthy cities. Finally,
unanimity among subnational entities are
also common when it comes to promote a
common formula of transfer distribution
(including criteria such as size, poverty,
regional location, rural population, etc.).
The combination of vertical and hori-
zontal conflict potential and the need to
differentiate actor’s preferences with
regard to the three different dimensions of
decentralization illustrates the enormous
difficulties of successfully coordinating a
coherent decentralization process. It is
therefore of little surprise, that one of the
mayor deficiencies of decentralization
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processes in Latin America has been a
high degree of incoherency. While a cer-
tain degree of incoherency is probably
endogenous to every process of decentral-
ization, highly incoherent distributional
arrangements with regard to political, fis-
cal, and administrative decentralization
are incompatible with the ordering princi-
ples of market preserving federalism and
subsidiarity.
However, it would be misleading to
conclude from such an analysis that
decentralization is a cause of continuous
political instability in several Latin Amer-
ican countries. Distribution conflicts and
coordination problems are endogenous to
every decentralization process. Yet, the
intensity of conflicts and coordination
problems depend to a high degree on the
heterogeneity of interests and the varying
degree of organizational strength among
the political actors involved. As such, like
democratization, the attempt of building
subsidiarity oriented state structures clear-
ly reveals the shortcomings of inclusive
nation and state building in many Latin
American countries during the past two
centuries. Highly centralized state struc-
tures, the political, economic and ethnic
marginalization of many social groups and
the continuous provision of privileges for
narrow elites have created a situation,
where the reform of state structures neces-
sarily opens up a Pandora box of many
shortcomings. To proclaim subsidiarity-
oriented decentralization as dysfunctional
for increasing democratic legitimacy and
promoting economic development thus
would be as misleading conclusion. What
are more likely to have catalyzed (but not
caused) phenomena of political instability
are the parallel processes of democratiza-
tion, decentralization and economic liber-
alization, which altogether have overbur-
dened the collective action capacities of
Latin American societies.
Political Parties and the Encompassing
Interest of Coherent Decentralization
The above-mentioned problems of dis-
tribution conflicts and distribution prob-
lems highlight the collective action prob-
lems of successful decentralization. As
subnational and central actors follow
rather special interests in this process, the
search for organizers of coherent decen-
tralization processes has to focus on actors
outside the national and subnational exec-
utive bodies. Unfortunately, civil society
is only to a very limited extend capable to
fulfil such a function. The function of
vivid and multi-facetted civil society
groups in democratic systems consists in
articulating the political concerns and
interests of citizens rather than in aggre-
gating the diversity of interests into con-
sistent political strategies. The aggregation
of interests in representative democracy is
the central task of political parties. Espe-
cially in decentralization processes, where
the central government has its own special
interests, political parties have a crucial
role as potential organizers of the encom-
passing interest of subsidiarity-oriented
decentralization. As political parties play
an important role on each level of govern-
ment and party elites will include success-
ful politicians from each level of govern-
ment, party structures seem to be the most
adequate place to develop encompassing
and coherent strategies of decentralization.
Unfortunately, most of Latin American
party systems seem to be ill equipped for
such a demanding task. First, many party
systems in Latin American democracies
are experiencing a problematic process of
fragmentation. When party systems split
into many small organizations, each party
will represent rather small sector and/or
region specific interests, thereby loosing
its capacity to provide coherent pro-
grammes for organizing the decentraliza-
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tion process. Second, the decentralization
process itself includes incentives for fur-
ther fragmenting party structures and party
systems because it tends to give local and
regional actors more voice. This again will
make it more difficult to organize encom-
passing political programs. However, the
institutional character of party organiza-
tions in Latin America still varies consid-
erably. In this context, comparative
research has shown that, on the one hand,
parties which give more autonomy to
regional and local actors tend to be charac-
terized by a higher level of fragmentation
then highly disciplined and centralist par-
ties. On the other hand, highly centralized
party structures in Latin America are most-
ly characterized by traditional Caudillo-
structures impeding intra-party democracy
and promoting populist and volatile poli-
cy-behaviour. Consequently, we should
not expect parties to take over the role of
organizers of an encompassing interest in
the near future. Instead, decentralization
processes in most Latin America countries
will continue to be volatile and incoherent.
This is, however, no reason to stop pro-
moting subsidiarity-oriented state reform
in the region, because constructing such
state structures is one of the most impor-
tant challenges to guarantee a develop-
ment-oriented and democratically legiti-
mated state.
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Stalled Political Reforms 
in Ecuador: Decentralization
under the Palacio Government
During the past two decades decentral-
ization has become one of the most impor-
tant political developments worldwide.
Governments in industrialized and devel-
oping countries alike engage in the transfer
of resources and responsibilities to subna-
tional entities. The list of aspired benefits
from decentralization is long: improve-
ment of public service provision, increased
citizen participation and less corruption,
just to name a few. Overall, decentraliza-
tion reforms offer the promise of more
accountable and transparent government. 
In Latin America, many of the new
democracies placed decentralization on
the political agenda, among them the
Republic of Ecuador. When the country
returned to democratic rule in 1978, direct
elections for provincial and municipal
councils were reintroduced. Subnational
elections constituted an important step
towards political decentralization. The
transfer of resources (fiscal decentraliza-
tion) and of responsibilities (administra-
tive decentralization) to subnational levels
of government, however, has been the
subject of intense political struggle and
controversy since redemocratization.
The case of Ecuador highlights the
promises as well as the pitfalls of decen-
tralization. The massive uprising of civil
society in April 2005 against the illiberal
governing style of ex-president Lucio
Gutiérrez led to the ouster of the Gutiérrez
government and brought to power former
vice-president Alfredo Palacio. In an
attempt to regain legitimacy in the face of
massive popular discontent with the polit-
ical class Palacio promised to reinvigorate
the decentralization process and to engage
in a dialogue with citizens about political
reform. 
The ouster of president Gutiérrez – the
seventh president in the last ten years –
dramatically underlines the need for polit-
ical reform to revive the country’s weak
and discredited political institutions.
While the national level has been charac-
terized by instability, subnational govern-
ments have demonstrated a considerable
level of stability, with about one third of
all mayors reelected in the last municipal
elections. Overall, confidence in munici-
palities is higher than confidence in
national political institutions. Hence,
empowering those stable subnational units
appears to be a promising strategy in order
to improve gobernabilidad, which has
been a key concern in the domestic politi-
cal debate.
While the need for political reform and
the relative stability of subnational govern-
ments highlight the promise of decentral-
ization, the case of Ecuador also underlines
potential pitfalls. Decentralization is a polit-
ical process and reforms have to be agreed
upon at the national level. So far, political
actors have been unable to formulate any
kind of long-term national decentralization
strategy. The result has been a highly prob-
lematic decentralization process. Even the
initiative of the Palacio government to rein-
vigorate decentralization is unlikely to be
able to effectively address and overcome
the shortcomings that characterize decen-
tralization in Ecuador.
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